This paper compares the success of venture capital investments in the United States and in Europe by analyzing individual venture-backed companies and the value generated within the stage …nancing process. We document that US venture capitalists generate signi…cantly more value with their investments than their European counterparts. We …nd di¤erences in contracting behavior, such as staging frequency and syndication, and evidence that they help to explain the observed performance gap and we report a substantial unexplained residual. We …nd that US venture funds investing in Europe do not perform better their European peers. European Common Law and Civil Law countries exhibit comparable levels of venture performance, and di¤erences in stock market development or tax subsidies in favor of venture investments are unrelated to performance di¤erences. European IPO exits from venture investments yield returns similar to the US, while trade sale exits weakly underperform. We attribute the overall performance gap essentially to the segment of poorly performing companies.
Introduction
Venture capital is an American invention, and the United States is home to the largest venture capital industry by far. Venture capital has not spread globally as easily as have other …nancial innovations. What are the necessary conditions for a successful imitation of the US model?
Europe, the world's second most important region in terms of R&D spending, is an interesting case to consider. While European governments have exhorted the virtues of venture capital, and designated its development as a key policy priority for more than twenty years, the sector has remained a laggard until recently. A European venture capital (VC) industry geared towards innovation and early-stage …nancing has really only taken hold in the late 1990s,with investments reaching 12 billion dollars in 1999, roughly a quarter of the US level.
This paper proposes a direct comparison between the United States and Europe, and seeks to explore the process by which VC creates economic value on the basis of company-level data.
It contributes to an emerging literature on comparative international studies of venture capital by focusing on possible obstacles to the emergence of a VC industry in developed countries with relatively high levels of R&D spending, investor protection, and law enforcement.
Trade associations and VC professionals have long asserted that realized returns of venture investments in Europe have historically been below required returns, and pointed to this underperformance as the main obstacle to the development of a strong VC industry. Also, the relative lack of venture funding in Europe has been frequently attributed to the absence of attractive and liquid markets for VC exits, in particular for IPOs (e.g., Black and Gilson, 1998) . These beliefs form the starting point for our analysis. We investigate whether a measurable performance gap between the United States and Europe exists for the late 1990s when the European VC market was emerging in terms funding levels and exit opportunities. And if so, what explains it? Does the European case hold more general lessons for venture capital development?
More speci…cally, we investigate the period between 1997 and 2003, starting with the year that marks the beginning of rapidly increasing venture funding levels in Europe and ending after European venture investments had peaked. Our focus on this recent period also o¤ers an opportunity to address Black and Gilson's hypothesis on the absence of su¢ ciently liquid primary equity markets, since this period was characterized in Europe by a surge in high-tech IPOs as well as the creation of a number of new stock markets geared to high-tech companies markets.
To the best of our knowledge, no comparative analysis of US and European VC performance has been undertaken previously.
Research Design and Results. Based on data from the Venture Economics database, we measure the value generated by every portfolio company in our sample by the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) between the …rst …nancing round and the last round valuation (prior to exit) of the project.
Round valuation data represent an intriguing data source in VC funding as they report the deal pricing in every …nancing round, i.e. actual transactions between stakeholders with con ‡icting interests that determine the fraction of equity-linked securities a¤orded to investors in exchange for their cash. Determining VC success on the basis of round valuations o¤ers a methodological advantage when compared with the alternative, analyzing performance until exit: performance measures based on exit valuations will inevitably select only projects that exit with a recorded market valuation; these investments, however, typically constitute an upwards biased sample.
Moreover, since we are interested in the economic value generated by venture investments rather than an assessment of the asset class, our method seems well-suited as it allows to compute the gross valuation e¤ect of venture investments rather than net cash disbursements to limited partners on which asset management studies focus. The focus on round valuations also allows us to perform new tests for data endogeneity based on lead-lag structures of intermediate valuations.
While our focus on early stage investments clustered in a few industries and a limited time period partially mitigates the impact of cross-sectional heterogeneity in risk, we explicitly control for risk, in particular for region-speci…c and technology-speci…c risk, but …nd results that are largely invariant with respect to the choice of risk adjustment. Our main results are the following.
Our data show a gap between the value generated by US venture capital investments and European investments that is statistically highly signi…cant and very large in economic terms. The di¤erence is independent of the choice of performance benchmark.
We observe several di¤erences in the relationship between VCs and entrepreneurial …rms and in their behavior that indicate a more active role of US VCs and a sophisticated cooperation between them. US venture capitalists invest almost twice as much in their portfolio companies, make a larger portion of funding contingent on the completion of the …rst round, organize themselves in larger syndicates, tend to involve corporate VC more frequently, and tend to be more specialized.
These di¤erences can partially explain the observed di¤erence in value creation. We …nd the positive relationship between the frequency of monitoring and performance that theory predicts for the US but a negative relationship in Europe. Also, the amount invested in the …rst round as well as the presence of corporate VC (dimensions where the US dominates) have a signi…cant positive impact on returns. Much of the performance gap, however, remains unexplained by such di¤erences.
US venture funds investing in Europe do not create more value than their European peers.
Venture investments in European Common Law and European Civil Law countries show a comparable level of value creation.
Di¤erences in the tax treatment or the legal environment for venture investments are unrelated to the gap in value creation.
For the subsample of companies with a successful venture exit, we …nd no performance di¤erence for companies exiting through IPOs and only a small di¤erence for companies exiting via trade sales. We conclude that the di¤erence in the value creation process must be primarily due to di¤erences in poorly performing investments as we …nd.
Overall, our results suggest that the United States appears to have a markedly better developed market for VC, with Europe still signi…cantly lagging behind. We test for a wide variety of possible reasons that the …nance literature mentions as possible performance drivers, but …nd that only contracting proxies can explain some of the di¤erence, while causes such as tax treatment, legal systems or stock market development, or the import of experienced VCs, seem to be unimportant. Other factors that our microlevel study based on VC transactions cannot capture may be important. 1 Related Literature. Our work is related to an emerging literature on international and comparative studies. On the whole they report VC contracting practices at variance with the US role model. Lerner and Schoar (2004) can account for a substantial fraction of cross-sectional return variations in IRRs. Our …ndings are generally consistent with these studies, but we try to explain internal rates of return simultaneously by company-speci…c and country-speci…c in ‡uences. This puts us in a position to argue that contracting features and the legal environment alone are unlikely to explain the distance to the United States.
The majority of empirical studies on VC in Europe are based on questionnaires. In a crosscountry analysis, Manigart et al. (2002) highlight some determinants of required returns on VC investments, and Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir (1996) examine the impact of the VC governance structure in di¤erent countries. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2004) show that independent, specialized, experienced and highly educated VCs are more likely to be actively involved in the management of portfolio companies. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2005) present questionnaire evidence that across Europe better legal systems (measured by legal origin or rule of law) are associated with more investor involvement, more downside protection for the investors, and more corporate governance involvement of VCs. Schwienbacher (2004) There has also been a recent literature studying the returns of private equity and VC from an asset pricing perspective, including Kaplan and Schoar (2005) , Gottschalg and Phalippou (2007) , Ljungqvist and Richardson (2004) , and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004). On the whole, this literature shows that private equity returns contain considerable systematic and idiosyncratic risk and that risk-adjusted net returns do not outperform public equity investments. 2 There are considerable di¤erences between this strand of work and our study. First, these studies focus on the United States and they mix VC and private equity investments whereas our study is very careful in selecting only VC investments in start-up companies. Second, since our focus is on economic value created rather than risk-adjusted investor returns, we look at investments at the portfolio-company level and we use stage valuations to minimize selection bias. By contrast, these studies look at returns at the fund level, 3 they focus on cash distributions and thus on exited investments. 4 Third, we focus on an international comparative study in which the US and the European samples are selected according to consistent criteria, whereas those studies have overwhelmingly US-based samples.
Therefore, from a methodological point of view, our paper is most closely related to two studies that calculate company-level returns for venture-related investments, namely Cochrane (2005) and Woodward and Hall (2003) . Both studies, however, use samples that exclusively contain US companies. Moreover, both studies are interested in understanding the risk-return trade-o¤, and their focus is on reducing the impact of sample selection bias. They do not explore 2 Moreover, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Gottschalg and Phalippou (2006) 4 Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Gottschalg and Phalippou (2006) make di¤erent assumptions on non-exited investments that explain a substantial part of the di¤erence in the aggregated performance estimates between these two studies.
performance drivers. Cochrane calculates returns for each …nancing round separately and limits the sample to …nal valuations from IPOs and trade sales, whereas we take an integrated approach that solicits as many observations as possible at each round. Woodward and Hall (2003) include round valuations just as we do, but they do not systematically research the impact of various contractual features on VC performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical background for our study. In Section 3 we describe the data and develop the variables used in our empirical tests. Section 4 presents the results of our comparative performance study. In Section 5 we investigate whether the performance gap can be attributed to di¤erences in the use and success of various exit routes. Section 6 discusses issues of robustness, selection bias and endogeneity.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Theoretical and Empirical Background
Two strands of prior work are relevant for our hypotheses, the mostly theoretical literature on the contractual relationship between venture …nanciers and entrepreneurs, and the mostly empirical literature that analyzes venture …nancing in the wider context of …nancial development.
Venture Capital Contracting
Monitoring, Advising and Relationship Financing. Venture capitalists are usually seen as actively involved relationship investors, and their monitoring role and the ensuing double agency problems have been emphasized by Schmidt (2003) and Cornelli and Yosha (2003) , Repullo and Suarez (2004) , among others, a view supported in empirical studies (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) . More speci…cally, they are seen as taking on a dual role as advisors and as monitors (e.g. Casamatta, 2003) and as being actively involved in constituting the management team and frequently replacing the founding entrepreneurial team (Hellmann, 1998) . Therefore, measures of a more active involvement of VCs in a project should be associated with more value creation.
We speci…cally investigate the relationship character of the link between VCs and portfolio companies. In this respect, we investigate two distinct hypotheses that can be characterized as the con ‡ict between relationship building versus specialization. On the one hand, along the lines of the …nancial intermediation literature (e.g. Rajan, 1992) , more continuity of VCs (over the entire project lifetime) means a closer relationship that reduces asymmetric information hurdles to …nancing. This should increase observed average performance. On the other hand, VCs may be specialized to accompany either initial stages or stages close to exit; specialization then clearly may be a source of value creation, as VCs presumably are more expert in the stage-speci…c skills of their contribution. Therefore, we will test whether a larger degree of continuity or a longer duration in the VC company relationship increases or decreases the value creation over the lifetime of the VC investment cycle in a project.
Based on the seminal contribution by Aghion and Bolton (1992) , the literature has emphasized that contingent control rights, such as the use of contingent securities or contingent voting rights, play an important role in the VC cycle and value creation process. Schwienbacher (2004) directly compares the use of contingent control rights in the United States and in Europe, and …nds that they are signi…cantly more common in the United States than in Europe, consistent with the predictions of Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2005) and with other empirical evidence. 5 There is no clear evidence, however, that these di¤erences directly explain VC performance. Our data do not allow us to contribute to this important analysis as we do not observe details on the securities that are issued in the …nancing rounds.
Stage Financing. The theory literature suggests that stage …nancing gives a real option to abandon a project that alleviates agency problems. In Neher (1999) , stage …nancing can reduce the bargaining power of entrepreneurs who can repudiate their …nancial obligations. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) analyze the problem of an entrepreneur manipulating short-term results for purposes of "window-dressing" and show that stage …nancing is a means to mitigate this problem.
Berk, Green and Naik (2004) focus on the evolution of the risk pro…le that changes from being purely technical risk in early stages and to more diverse sources of risk in later stages and show that the systematic risk component is strongest in early stages, justifying a larger risk premium. 5 Additional evidence on the less frequent use of contingent securities outside the US is documented for example in Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg (2003) , Lerner and Schoar (2005) , Cumming (2005) and Bascha an Walz (2001) , when comparing them to US studies. An important alternative hypothesis is proposed by Gilson and Schizer (2002) who attribute the frequent use of convertibles in the United States to tax considerations. Elitzur and Gavious (2003) and Bergemann and Hege (2003) suggest that stage …nancing reduces the entrepreneur's information rent, and allows to increase entrepreneurial e¤ort and alleviate …nancial constraints. Cuny and Talmor (2005) compare traditional round …nancing with milestone …nancing, where VCs commit to the …nancial terms of multiple funding stages conditional on achieving certain benchmarks. 6 All of these papers, and a host of empirical literature (for example Gompers, 1995) , suggest that a higher frequency of milestones and …nancing rounds should translate into a more e¤ective use of the abandonment decision, and hence smaller agency costs and better investment performance. Therefore, we will test whether a more frequent use of staging instruments implies higher performance. A related question is the relationship in a syndicate between experienced or highly reputed VCs and comparatively young and small ones. The theory literature is not unanimous in this respect. Barry et al. (1990) Moreover, syndication facilitates the inclusion of corporate investors that can act as a commitment device to avoid hold-up problems and help secure distribution channels or a potentially important customer pool, see e.g. Hellmann (2002) and Riyanto and Schwienbacher (2006) . The corporate venture fund can also provide additional complementary skills to the syndicate as well as important resources from the corporation that backs it. Therefore, we also explore the value impact of the presence of corporate VC in the investor pool. 7 
Financing of Innovation, Financial Development and Tax Incentives
Based on previous literature that analyzes conditions for VC and the …nancing of innovation in a wider context, we explore the following aspects.
IPO Exits. Black and Gilson (1998) identify the lack of IPO markets for VC exits as the main reason why venture …nancing lags behind in countries such as Germany or Japan. Portfolio companies where venture investors exit through IPOs are generally associated with higher returns (see Gompers, 1995 , for the US and Schwienbacher, 2004, for Europe). While historically Europe o¤ered little opportunity for high-tech …rms to go public, the creation of technology-oriented stock markets in all of Europe's main countries in the late 1990s 8 has created a more even …eld between the US and Europe, at least for the period of time where these new markets o¤ered a fairly liquid alternative for VC exits. 9 Therefore, we would expect a relatively equal VC performance in Europe and the US for ventures that exited during the liquid IPO market in Europe, i.e. 1998-2000. (2003) and Black and Gilson (1998) identify the importance of market-based …nancing, and in particular the role of stock exchanges, as a key determinant for successful venture development. This hypothesis suggests that we should …nd a higher intensity and also higher returns of VC funding in countries with a high stock market 7 Other rationales for venture capital syndication are provided by Admati and P ‡eiderer (1994) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1991). 8 The German Neuer Markt, the French Nouveau Marché, London-based Techmark and Brussels-based Easdaq are the best-known examples, which all broadly used the Nasdaq as their role model. 9 In the wake of the collapse of the internet boom, a number of these markets have ceased to exist or been merged with the main stock markets (Easdaq and the Neuer Markt for example), whereas others continue to exist but had very little IPO activity between 2001 and 2004. capitalization/GDP ratio, the most widely used metric of stock market development. Since Europe contains both countries with a higher ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP than the US (UK, Netherlands, Switzerland) as well as countries with a lower ratio (most countries on the continent), there is su¢ cient variation in the data to make this a rich test. taxation. Such public subsidies may be a source of underperformance if they distort investment decisions and make VCs inclined to fund projects that they would otherwise reject (see Lerner, 1999 ). We hypothesize, therefore, that measures of …scal subsidies and related supports to venture funding may be negatively related with performance.
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Law and
Data
Our data set is constructed from the database of Venture Economics, a division of Thomson Financial. Venture Economics o¤ers the best available database for performance-related data on European VC markets, even though the reporting is substantially less complete than on the US side. For Europe, we extract from this database all portfolio companies for the 15 countries that were member of the European Union during the period of our study (EU-15). Since the paper focuses on venture capital, we limit the search to all companies that are reported as venture capital-related in the database (i.e. we exclude notably buyout-and restructuring-related transactions). We then require that Venture Economics report at least one valuation observation for a portfolio company, i.e. the estimated total value of the company …rm at one or more …nancing stages. Firm valuations are the reported values on which the contracts and share allocations at the beginning of each new …nancing round are based. We obtain a sample of 394 companies. Among them are 188 from the United Kingdom, 65 from France, 51 from Germany, 25 from Ireland, 16 from Italy, 12 from Sweden, 11 from the Netherlands, 11 from Belgium, 7 from Spain, 5 from Denmark and 3 from Austria.
To correct for possible misclassi…cations of …rms in the Venture Economics's venture capitalrelated database, we remove from the sample all companies that have neither a single round that was de…ned as "seed"or "early stage" in the database nor at most three years of age at the time of their …rst …nancing round. Our objective is to avoid comparing di¤erent types of investment on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore, we also apply a …lter restricting the sample to companies with a …rst …nancing round not earlier than January 1997, and drop a couple of outliers based on pre-…nancing size or age, leaving us with 274 observations. Our focus on early stage investments that are clustered in a few industries and that span a short time window of seven years largely reduces the role of any important heterogeneity in project risk. Nevertheless we include explicit controls for risk. First, we choose a risk adjustment that speci…cally addresses regional di¤erences in risk between the US and Europe by calculating excess returns relative to the MSCI index in each region. Second, we choose the NASDAQ index as an alternative risk adjustment that controls for the asset class of high-tech companies. In the absence of any comparable high-tech stock market index for Europe, we cannot control for both sources of risk simultaneously. We …nd that our results are virtually identical under both risk adjustment procedures, leading us to conclude that the speci…c choice of risk adjustment is irrelevant for the results that we report. A third possible risk adjustment, namely industry-speci…c risk, seems impracticable for our sample given that it is dominated by very few industries. Therefore, we only control for …rms that are either internet speci…c or in Communication and Media.
We also need to exclude companies for which a performance measure could not be calculated for lack of data. These are companies for which we had only a single valuation observation and where this valuation concerned the …rst …nancing stage. These companies were dropped from the sample. Our …nal sample contains 146 European companies, 71 of them being from the United Kingdom and 75 from Continental Europe or Ireland.
For the United States, we construct a random sample of comparable size. We apply the same …ltering criteria as for European companies, limiting the sample to venture-related portfolio companies for which there is at least one valuation entry recorded (close to 6000 as of June 2003), that have at least one …nancing round that is characterized as "seed"or "early stage", and where the …rst …nancing round took place in or after January 1997. We then randomly select a sample of 233 companies that satisfy the criterion that at least two valuations are reported, of which one in the initial round.
Additional data sources complementing our data include the tax and legal index developed by the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA, 2003) 10 ; World Bank data for 1997 for country measures of stock market capitalization; and …nally Dealogic, Lexis-Nexis, Factiva and national stock exchanges as sources on exits and exit valuations.
Description of Variables
For all the companies in our sample, we extract the following information from the Venture Economics database: the age of the …rm at the moment of the …rst …nancing stage, the activity of the …rm, and for each …nancing stage, the date at which it took place, the type of the investors (public, corporate or …nancial), the amount they have invested and the post-money valuation of the …rm. From this information, we de…ne variables that can be grouped as follows:
Portfolio company characteristics. We capture company age by de…ning a variable AGE as the time lapsed between its founding date and the date of its …rst …nancing round. For industry a¢ liation, we group companies in seven industry groups. 11 Information about the industry in which the company operates is captured by the dummy TMT which is equal to 1 if the activity of the …rm is either internet speci…c or Communication and Media, and 0 otherwise.
Lifetime variables. First, we de…ne the total duration between the …rst and the last stage (TOTALDURATION) and the number of stages (TOTALSTAGES). The ratio between these two variables gives a measure the frequency of …nancing rounds (AVG DURATION). We frequently use the notation N for the value of TOTALSTAGES. Second, we de…ne the variable AVG CONTI which represents the average continuity of investors. AVG CONTI is constructed as follows. For each stage n 2, we compute the number of times that VC s participating in stage n participated in previous stages. This number is then divided by (n 1) times the number of VC s participating in stage n. We obtain CONTI(n), and we can then de…ne AVG CONTI as
which is a measure of the average fraction of continuing VCs in each of the N …nancing rounds. . We also use a measure of continuity of investment between the …rst two rounds (EARLY CONTI), which is a dummy equal to 1 at least one fund invested in both stages 1 and 2, and 0, otherwise.
Market conditions. We want to take into account market conditions, and more precisely the so-called "internet bubble" on valuations and returns. To do so, we de…ne two dummy variables:
BUBBLE START and BUBBLE END. The former one is equal to 1 if the …rst stage took place between September 1998 and March 2000 and 0 otherwise, and the latter dummy is equal to 1 if the …nal valuation took place between September 1998 and September 2000 and 0 otherwise. 12 We …nd similar results when using year dummies (omitted from the tables). In the analysis we further use the variable COMMON LAW that equal to 1 if the portfolio company is located in a Common Law country, and 0 otherwise. We also include the dummy variable EU DUMMY that is equal to one for European companies and zero for US investments.
Summary Statistics
We report summary statistics of the explanatory variables in 
Results
Performance Measures
Our main measures of the return of each company are based on the …rst and the last observed valuation entry of the project (prior to exit). We …rst calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) of the project, by taking into account all intermediate investments. 13 then, we follow the standard procedure and take logs of the IRR; the empirical frequency distribution of the resulting random variable LOG IRR exhibits an approximately normal distribution. 14 One problem with the IRR and LOG IRR measures is that they calculate each projects'return in an isolated way, without adjusting for realized market returns and systematic risk. To adjust for the risk relative to the realized market return, we develop as a second return measure the excess return of the project compared with the reference market. For Europe, we calculate the excess return as the di¤erence between the IRR and the MSCI Europe Index return over the same period while for the US, we calculate the excess return as the di¤erence between the IRR and the MSCI US Index return over the same period. For log returns, we take logs of the MSCI returns and subtract them from LOG IRR to obtain the log excess return (LOG EXC) as our principal dependent variable.
For many companies, we only have one valuation observation. As explained earlier, we drop all observations where the unique valuation is in the …rst …nancing round. For those companies in our sample for which we observe only a single valuation at a round later than the …rst round, we estimate a valueV 1j for the …rst stage valuation of company j as follows. For all the companies for which a valuation at stage 1 was available, we calculate a multiple Q i = V 1i =I 1i expressing the initial company value for company i as a multiple of the initial investment. We then calculate an average ratio Q k for each of our seven industries k = 1; : : : ; 7; as the equal-weighted mean of all the companies belonging to this particular industry. The observed Q k are actually slightly larger in Europe, but we use uniform Q k across which introduces a bias against our results. We then estimate the missing …rst-stage valuationV 1j for a …rm j located in industry k a the product
We …nd very similar results to those reported in our tables if we restrict the analysis to the 61% of companies in our sample with complete valuation information.
Summary statistics and comparisons between the Europe and the United States are given in Table 3 . Data are winsorized at the 1% level to reduce the impact of the extreme return values. 1 3 The IRR iscalculated as the rate r such that
where VT is the …nal valuation, V0 the initial valuation; and It the investment amount in period 0 < t T: 1 4 Using logs is generally appropriate since raw returns are distributed asymetrically over the interval (-100%, 1). In the case of venture capital returns, this adjustment is indispensable since outliers with extreme IRRs close to -100% or above +500% occur.
We observe that the mean and the median excess returns in the United States are 279% and 61:37%, respectively. Comparatively, they are only 62:5% and 25:19%, respectively, in Europe.
Both mean and median excess returns are signi…cantly lower in Europe (at the 0:01% level). The same results hold when considering unadjusted returns, or returns measured in logs. 15 It should also be added that 69% of European projects are below the median while only 39% of US projects are below the median (not reported in the tables). The signi…cance level of our comparison of means and medians remains equally strong results if we compare raw returns without winsorizing. Gottschalg and Phalippou (2007) argue that IRR may be a misleading performance measure as it does not account for di¤erences in the investment horizon of projects or in the amount of funds invested. In our view, the concern about di¤erent investment horizons is important when VC is considered from an asset pricing perspective but less relevant for our study that focuses on economic value created. Moreover, we do not expect it to matter as the di¤erence in total duration between Europe and the US is insigni…cant. As a robustness check, we consider alternative performance measures, in particular a pro…tability index with a 10% and a 20% discount rate European-grown peers. To test for this hypothesis, we split the European sample into projects where at least one US-based venture capitalist was involved (hence contribute to the value creation process) and those where only European investors were present in all …nancing rounds. There are 97 European projects in which a US VC was involved. The performances of …rms from these two sub-groups of European projects are not signi…cantly di¤erent at the 10% level (See Table 3 ,
Panel C). We also …nd that the average Log Excess Return of European projects with US VC is lower than the average Log Excess Return for of US projects at the 0:1% level (not reported in the tables). To test further the possible impact of US VCs on the performance of European projects,
we sort out European projects in which more than 20% of the involved VCs are US VCs. There are 59 such projects. Their average Log Excess Return is 0:3490. There are 88 other European projects. Their average Log Excess Return is 0:3471. Again, the average performances in these two subgroups are not statistically di¤erent at the 10% level. Hence, we do not …nd any evidence that the lower performance of US-based projects is due to the absence of the experience of US venture capitalists, 16 and the explanation for the performance gap must be sought elsewhere. In our view, this …nding does not contradict earlier evidence on the more sophisticated behavior of US venture capital providers abroad compared to local funds. They could for example indicate that distance and geographical proximity are important and hard to overcome as an e¤ective barrier to the international expansion of venture capital development.
A second plausible explanation is whether the legal system in which a start-up company operates has an impact on its performance (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). While there are various dimensions of di¤erences in legal systems that vary across Europe, we are unable to imple-ment tests for di¤erences such as legality/absence of corruption and quality of law enforcement, because our sample is heavily concentrated in North and Western European countries that exhibit little variation along these dimensions. We can, however, test for the legal origin. To do so, we split our European sample into companies from Common Law countries (UK and Ireland) and companies from Civil Law origins (all other countries). 17 Testing for di¤erence in performances, we do not …nd evidence that projects from Common Law countries obtain a higher return than those from Civil Law countries (see Table 3 , Panel D). Rather, we …nd weak evidence of a smaller median performance in Common Law countries. This suggests that legal origin can be ruled out as a determinant of the performance gap.
Finally, the performance di¤erence could be owed to cross-country di¤erences in …nancial development (with stock market capitalization as the leading indicator) or to di¤erences in tax treatments. We explore these avenues in the context of our regression analysis.
Multivariate Regression Analysis
Having highlighted di¤erences in performances between US and European projects, we perform standard OLS regressions in order to …nd out which characteristics in ‡uence the performance of a …rm, and …nd whether they provide a rationale for the di¤erence in performances observed between the United States and Europe. First, we perform three types of regression for the entire sample. The …rst regression considers …rm speci…c information and market conditions. The second regression adds conditions about the …rst …nancing stage while the third regression considers …rm speci…c information, market conditions and contract variables that should be play a role during the entire life cycle of the venture project. We also interact all these variables with the EU DUMMY variable to see whether they have a di¤erent impact on performance in Europe and in the United States. Then, we run the same types of regressions for European …rms, excluding the EU DUMMY variable and adding the US VC dummy variable. For all the regressions, the dependent variable is LOG EXC, the logarithm of the excess return over the MSCI indices.
Results for the entire sample are provided in Table 4 that break down the measures of the contracting relationship in two parts: Table 4a reports the regression for the variables that capture the conditions in the …rst …nancing round, whereas Table 4b captures average conditions over the entire …nancing period. We observe that the EU DUMMY variable comes out highly signi…cant at the 0:1% level in all regressions; it is the single most powerful variable in all the regression speci…cations that we ran.
Conversely, the COMMON LAW dummy variable does not come out signi…cantly. These results con…rm the …ndings of the t-test analysis of returns in Table 3 . we also use several countryspeci…c variables. Table 4a documents that neither the stock market development (1997 market capitalization as a fraction of GDP) nor the EVCA tax and legal index 18 show any measurable impact. We reject therefore our hypotheses that stock market development or tax subsidies and related conditions play a signi…cant role in explaining the European underperformance over the sample period.
Concerning project size variables, we observe that the average project size (AVG AMOUNT) has a signi…cant impact on performance. However, this impact is positive in the United States, suggesting economies of scale, while it is negative in Europe. AMOUNT STAGE 1 is also signi…cantly negative at the 0:1% level. Since Europeans invest a signi…cantly larger fraction of total investments in the …rst round, this suggest that the power of making funding conditional on milestones is weaker when more of the overall funds is provided up-front, and thus unconditionally.
Concerning contracting variables, an important …nding is that the round duration variables, either measured by the average round duration (AVG DURATION) or the …rst round duration (DURATION STAGE 1), have signi…cant impacts on performance of opposite sign in the United
States and in Europe. For the United States, the round-duration-performance relationship is as theory predicts: shorter round imply more monitoring, hence better performance. The observed positive relationship observed for Europe is puzzling. It might suggest that European VCs are more reactive than proactive; in other words, European VCs tend to shorten funding intervals 1 8 The EVCA index is an aggregate score for 2003 (the …rst year for which it is available) with the best score of 1.2 for Great Britain and the lowest score of 2.53 for Austria in our sample. Taking the EVCA criteria, we determine a score of 1.4 for the United States by our own calculations. The US obtains a score slightly lower than Britain (but higher than all other countries in Europe) notably because of relatively high corporate tax rates and lengthy bankruptcy procedures.
The EVCA score is an aggregate score over 13 measures of …scal and legal conditions; we obtain similar results when we use only the score for tax subsidies towards venture investments. only when things turn wrong.
We …nd almost no impact for our measure of the continuity of funding relationships. If anything, there seems to be a slight advantage for specialization over ongoing relationships.
Results for the European sample are provided in Table 5 . Results are identical to those of Table 4 concerning contract and market condition variables: the average round duration and the …rst round duration have an signi…cant positive impact of the performance. Furthermore, the US VC dummy and the COMMON LAW dummy do not come out signi…cantly, con…rming the results of Table 3 .
Overall, we …nd evidence that contracting-related variables matter. They tend to come out with the sign predicted by theory in the United States, but with the wrong sign in Europe. These explanatory variables, however, cannot fully explain the di¤erences in VC performance since the coe¢ cient for the EU Dummy remains economically signi…cant.
Exit Choices and Venture Capital Performance
The literature has long held that exit conditions are a key performance driver in venture …nancing, and the absence of an active IPO market for venture-backed companies has been viewed as the perhaps single most important reason for the late and timid development of venture …nancing in Europe (Black and Gilson, 1998) . Moreover, there is ample evidence that the exit choices of venture-backed start-ups follow a clear performance hierarchy, with top-performing companies choosing IPOs, companies opting for trade sales on average performing less well, whereas troubled investments would see delayed exits or write-o¤s. Our objective in this section is to explore whether we …nd evidence for di¤erences in exit performance or in the hierarchy of exit routes that could help to explain the transatlantic performance gap. This question is particularly interesting for our sample period because, as argued in Section 2., a characteristic element from 1997 to 2003 is that new stock markets had opened across Europe modeled after the NASDAQ example that were geared up to high-tech start-ups, and that were successful almost instantly, in terms of the number of IPOs they could attract. Our hypothesis is, therefore, that the Black and Gilson argument of the role of a lacking IPO market, while historically true, was no longer applicable to this period. Conversely, if we …nd di¤erences in the performance of venture-backed companies going public between the US and Europe, this might indicate that the existence of dedicated stock markets is not su¢ cient to create exit conditions conducive to venture …nancing.
To investigate these issues, we extend our observation horizon to include the exit stage, and we explore whether we …nd signi…cant di¤erences in the relative performance of the subsamples having opted for di¤erent exit options. Speci…cally, we construct samples of venture-backed companies in the US and in Europe having exited via an IPO or via a trade sale. We then seek to obtain data on exit valuations for these companies, and we calculate a new IRR for the complete venture capital cycle from the …rst investment round to exit that we call the "full venture cycle IRR", as opposed to the IRRs used so far that stopped at the last reported …nancing round.
Within our US sample of 233 randomly selected companies after 1997 described in Section 3., we are able to identify 32 companies that exited via an IPO (13.7% of the US sample) and 52 trade sales (22.2%) that occur between 1997 and early 2005 from Venture Economics. We …nd exit valuations for 29 of the IPOs (12.4% of the US sample) and 32 of the trade sales (13.7%), which together form our US exit sample. 19 In Europe, we encounter the di¢ culty that the number of companies having exited through an IPO or a trade sale within our sample of 146 companies with su¢ cient valuation information is too small for a statistical evaluation. 20 To overcome this problem, we go back to our base sample of European venture-backed companies obtained from Venture Economics with …rst rounds in the 1997-2003 period, and after applying the same …lters as before we initially select all companies that are reported as exited through IPO or acquisition.
Most of these companies had to be excluded previously because there was insu¢ cient valuation information to determine an IRR based on round valuations. We then seek to obtain data on exit valuations for this sample, which yields a sample of 54 IPOs and 19 trade sales in Europe for 1 9 The US exit valuations were all found in Venture Economics. 2 0 In the sample of 146 European observations, we can identify only 8 IPOs with observable exit valuations, even though we search through a variety of additional data sources such as national stock markets and equity issues reported in Dealogic. We believe that there are two reasons for this scarcity of exit observations: …rst, the slump in the liquidity conditions on the exit markets after 2001 was more severe and more protracted in Europe than in the US. Second, a majority of the companies in the European sample start relatively late in the sample period, and many of them were not ready for exit before liquidity conditions on the exit markets worsened. We cannot exclude, however, a selection bias in the Venture Economics data base that relies on voluntary reporting. which we can estimate the IRRs over their full venture cycle. 21 Table 6 contains the …ndings for the IPO and the trade sale sample. We ignore observations with a very short complete venture cycle (less than three months for IPOs and four months for trade sales) since they contain a disproportionate number of extreme outliers, and also because performance will re ‡ect market conditions more than fundamentals if venture capitalists have such a short time to add value. The summary statistics show that, consistent with previous literature, companies that exit through IPOs exhibit a very high performance on average, with an annual IRR of 1,001% (median 160.7%), and almost identical numbers for excess return relative to regional MSCI segment (mean 988.4%, median 150.4%). Companies exiting through acquisitions show a performance that is markedly lower, with a mean IRR of 93.3% (median -8.8%). When looking at excess returns, with a mean of 96.9% (median 0.6%), returns are slightly higher, implying that trade sales are particularly a¤ected by adverse market timing e¤ects, that is, exits taking place under adverse market conditions. While there is considerable uncertainty because of small samples and an important in-sample variance, the means appear still high when compared with the average performance reported above in Section 4.. Thus, our …ndings appear to lend support to the concept of a performance hierarchy according to the exit path. 22 Is this hierarchy a possible explanation for the strong performance gap between the US and Europe that we …nd? When we look at possible return di¤erences in the top segment of companies exiting through IPOs, the answer seems to be negative. We …nd a mean IRR of 404% (median 162%) in the US and a mean IRR of 1,370 % (median 159%) in Europe, and very similar numbers when we look at excess returns relative to the respective MSCI segments. So while the mean IPO returns are actually higher in Europe than in the US, and the medians indistinguishable (slightly higher in the US for absolute returns and higher in Europe for excess returns), none of these 2 1 We searched Venture Economics but also a variety of other sources, including the Dealogic database on equity issuance, Lexis-Nexis and Factiva, national stock exchanges, and …nally in a few cases communications from researchers monitoring IPO activity in Europe. We thank in particular Peter Roosenboom and Wolfgang Aussenegg for their help.
Our resampling strategy is so successful because a large number of European companies with successful exits had to be excluded earlier as we could not calculate an intermediate IRR, but we can now determine the IRR over the full venture cycle by adding the observation of their exit valuations. The ensuing exit sample is derived from the same Venture Economics base sample employed before and shows no systematic di¤erence to the earlier sample.
di¤erences is statistically signi…cant as we report in Table 6. A di¤erent picture emerges when we look at trade sales. Here, the Europeans underperform, with a mean IRR of -12.4% (median -30.4%). Adverse market conditions can only account for a fraction of this poor performance, since excess returns are still substantially negative with a mean of -7.7% (median -20.4%). By contrast, in the US acquisitions are positive, with a mean IRR of 156% (median -2.6%) that, when stripping out the contemporaneous MSCI market returns, become unambiguously positive with a mean of 159% (median of 6.7%). Our t-tests show that the di¤erence in means is signi…cant at the 5% level, but there is only a weakly signi…cant di¤erence in medians.
Overall, we …nd that companies with an IPO exit perform similarly in the US and in Europe, whereas trade sales show some evidence of a performance di¤erence. For the residual and (in our sample) largest segment, we cannot make any direct comparison since performance is of course unobservable. This segment encompasses the wide spectrum of companies that are written o¤, that do never exit or exit by other means, such as buybacks or …nancial acquisitions. But it seems possible to conclude that the observed di¤erence on the trade sale subsample appears insu¢ cient to explain the performance gap that we document for the full sample, based on the following simple calculation: a performance di¤erence in median excess returns of 9.4% (168% in means) in this segment cannot account for a di¤erence of 84% in median excess returns in the full sample (483% in means; see Table 2 for the comparison), given that there is no di¤erence in the IPO segment. 23 Thus, it is highly probable that in the bottom segment for which we cannot observe performance, European venture capital strongly underperforms its US counterpart. On the whole, our …ndings appear consistent with the notion that the underperformance in Europe is explained by much lower returns for poorly performing companies.
An important caveat is that we have no means to verify whether the three main exit routes (IPOs, trade sales, and others) occur in roughly comparable frequencies in Europe and in the United States. It is possible that European venture capital underperforms not because in any of the three performance segments companies do less well than their US counterparts, but because top and medium performers are signi…cant less frequent than in the USA. In either case, we conclude that the performance di¤erence is likely to occur at the bottom of the hierarchy. However, we cannot say whether this is due to a less discriminating project selection or whether monitoring and stopping decisions of troubled venture projects are less successful.
Robustness and Endogeneity Concerns
Sample Selection Bias
Selection bias is an important concern in any empirical study on venture capital performance, and by applying Heckman corrections, based on imputed sample means that they obtain by using the best available (but still incomplete) reporting on the …nal exit routes of portfolio companies. Their methods cannot fully correct for sample selection bias, however, and we cannot replicate their procedures for lack of exit observations in the European sample.
Our return measure that spans only up to the last …nancing round and does not include the exit stage should be less exposed to the bias for exited projects for the following reason: poor performers that are written o¤ or that have no recorded exit will not be included in a sample where performance is determined until exit, but they should be included in our sample (unless there was only a single …nancing round). While we do not want to put too much weight on this argument it is, in our view, an important theoretical advantage of our return measure.
We certainly concede that a self-selection bias produced by voluntarily reported valuations remains. Our primary argument with respect to this bias is that any bias present in our sample should work against our main result of a performance gap between the US and Europe. Since voluntary reporting to Venture Economics is much less complete in Europe than in the US, it should be easier for European funds than for US funds to report selectively (presumably there is less peer pressure to disclose transactions). As noted, voluntary selective reporting should typically translate into an upward bias. Thus, the upwards bias should be worse in Europe than in the US. Also, European deal reporting should be subject to less scrutiny from comparisons with other reporting sources, such as limited partners.
Finally, the aggregate return numbers for Europe imply very poor realized returns over the sample period, in absolute terms and relative to a variety of performance benchmarks, that make any large-scale upwards bias in returns unlikely.
Endogeneity Problems
An important concern is the possible endogeneity of the contracting-related variables in our regressions. For example, it could be argued that a highly signi…cant variable such as AVG DURA-TION is determined by unobservable characteristics that in ‡uence both company performance and contracting choices since the contracting parties knew from the outset.
Reverse Causality. To a large extent, we should be able to address this concern by testing for the presence of reverse causality. Namely, if contracting choices are driven by unobserved characteristics that also determine performance, then regressing performance in early …nancing rounds on contracting conditions in subsequent rounds should show a signi…cant relationship, assuming that returns are persistent over the sample horizon. The staged nature of venture funding provides a good opportunity to check for reverse causality, since the observation period in many cases encompasses more than two valuation observations so that we can construct dependent and independent variables over successive time periods. We proceed as follows. For all …rms for which we have at least three valuations (119 US …rms and 22 European …rms), we compute an internal rate of return for …nancing round between the …rst and the second valuation (IRR1) and an internal rate of return for …nancing rounds between the second and the last valuation (IRR2). From these two internal rates of returns, we construct LOG EXC1 and LOG EXC2 and we also construct lifetime-information variables for the two periods in the same way as described in Section 4.1.. Running OLS regressions with LOG EXC1 as the explained variable and lifetimeinformation variables as explanatory variable for the full sample, we do not …nd any evidence of reverse causality: the coe¢ cient for the AVG DURATION variable for the second period is insigni…cant, and the same is true for other contracting-related variables reported in Table 4 . The only exception is subsequent funding, since we do …nd a weakly signi…cant positive relationship between performance in the …rst period and AVG AMOUNT in the second period. This relationship, however, is expected and expresses only that VCs are reactive to good performance early on. Interestingly, we …nd such a reactive relationship only in the US, not in Europe.
Instrumental Variables Tests. Another standard method that we apply is to de…ne instrumental variables for the variables possibly a¤ected by endogeneity problems. For each of the contracting-related variables AVG AMOUNT, AVG SYNDICATE SIZE and AVG DURATION, as well as for the corresponding variables covering the …rst round (AMOUNT STAGE 1, SYNDI-CATE SIZE STAGE 1, and DURATION STAGE 1, we de…ne as instruments the average values that we …nd for these variables over the entire US sample contained in Venture Economics. We then …t these instruments successively in an instrumental variables regression with the appropriate error correction. We …nd that the variables AVG DURATION, AVG AMOUNT and DURATION STAGE 1 remain signi…cant in the full sample, but not in the European sample. Thus, overall our instrumental variables regressions seem to con…rm that our results are not fundamentally driven by endogeneity.
Return Benchmark
We veri…ed that our results on the performance gap are not driven by the choice of the respective benchmark indices, the MSCI US and MSCI Europe, respectively. While these are arguably the best available international equity market benchmarks, they report the returns on mature public equity markets whereas venture investments concern highly illiquid stakes in small technology …rms. A better suited benchmark would be the segment of public equity markets that is closest to the sample of …rm under consideration, i.e. a market index for small technology …rms. The di¢ culty is that a convincing benchmark for European technology …rms, even on a country level, is not available. We therefore benchmarked both the US and the European sample against the NASDAQ Composite index, and recalculated the LOG EXC variable. The …ndings are almost unchanged, both in the univariate comparison of the performance gap as in the regression analysis. In fact, as inspection of Table 3 shows, the impact of the benchmarking index is negligible compared to the level and risk in the LOG IRR variable.
Conclusion
Until very recently, research on venture capital has exclusively focused on the United States, and quite naturally so since this industry was hardly existent in other parts of the world. The bull market for high-tech …rms in the late 1990s has created markets for venture capital elsewhere. This sample selection bias that we cannot address should actually magnify the e¤ect of our main result.
We show that the US venture capital industry strongly outperform their European peers.
When trying to identify determinants of this performance gap, we …nd that contracting-related determinants play a crucial role: 1) US venture capitalists show a positive relationship between total funding and performance while the reverse is true for Europeans. One reason appears to be that US VCs react with an increased funding ‡ow upon good early performance, in contrast to Europeans; 2) US VCs use instruments of control and contingent funding e¢ ciently, since performance reacts positively to shorter funding intervals in the US, while the opposite is true in Europe; 3) US-based venture investors use syndication more e¤ectively, as their syndicates grow over time, while their European counterparts do not. Moreover, US VCs include more specialized VCs and more corporate investors. Overall, there is evidence that US venture capitalists are more sophisticated than their European counterparts (in the sense that their behavior is more aligned with theoretical predictions) and that this contributes to the explanation of the di¤erence in performance.
We also investigate possible reverse causality and de…ne instruments to address endogeneity problems; these tests show that our results are unlikely to be driven by endogeneity.
When looking at other potential determinants of the performance gap we …nd no evidence that the performance gap can be attributed to the di¤erence in legal origin between Common Law and Civil Law countries, to stock market capitalization, or to the tax environment for venture …nancing. Surprisingly, we do not …nd evidence that European companies that include US-based venture funds among their …nanciers perform any better than companies that rely exclusively on European homegrown funds. Thus, it seems that the larger expertise and more sophisticated approach to contracting of US VCs that is documented in a number of earlier and contemporaneous studies is not easily leveraged into other markets or successfully exported abroad. Disentangling the origins of this di¢ culty further is an important question for future research. companieswith a …rst …nancing round in 1997 or later and that are genuine venture-backed companies (seed or early stage funding in at least one round or less than 3 years old), and had at least one successive valuation recorded.
EU Dummy = 1 if the company is based in one of the EU-15 countries, and EU Dummy = 0 if the company is in the US. All other variables are explained in Table 1 and Table 4a . The sample is winsorized by eliminating 1% of outliers. Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White) t-statistics in brackets. Levels of signi…cance: =10%, =5%, =1%, =0.1%. 
